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THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Evan Fox-Decent
McGill University Faculty of Law
Evan J. Criddle
Syracuse University College of Law
We argue that human rights are best conceived as norms arising from a fiduciary
relationship that exists between states (or statelike actors) and the citizens and nonci-
tizens subject to their power. These norms draw on a Kantian conception of moral
personhood, protecting agents from instrumentalization and domination. They do
not, however, exist in the abstract as timeless natural rights. Instead, they are corre-
lates of the state’s fiduciary duty to provide equal security under the rule of law, a duty
that flows from the state’s institutional assumption of irresistible sovereign powers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among political theorists and philosophers, conventional wisdom holds
that human rights are rights that all human beings share simply by virtue of
their common humanity.1 Since World War II, public international law has
embraced the concept of human rights, accepting a wide range of interna-
tional norms as full-bodied legal constraints on state action. Nonetheless,
international law has yet to develop a robust theory to illuminate the philo-
sophical basis for human rights as legal obligations. Although moral and
political philosophers have endeavored to explain the theoretical basis of
human rights, none of the leading theories offers a persuasive justification
for international human rights law as it has been understood and practiced
for the past six decades. Uncertainty regarding the philosophical basis for
human rights has impeded efforts to clarify the scope, justiciability, and
cross-cultural relevance of international human rights law.
In this article we develop a theory of human rights that illuminates their
juridical character and furnishes a principled framework for specifying the
contours and requirements of international human rights law. We argue
that human rights emanate from a fiduciary relationship between the state
1. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (1998); ALAN GEWIRTH, HU-
MAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS 1 (1982); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any
Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955); A. JOHN SIMMONS, Human Rights and World Citizenship,
in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 185 (2001).
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and persons subject to its powers. Fiduciary relations denote the subjection
of one party to the ongoing administrative power of another, such as one
finds in the trustee-beneficiary relationship. Drawing on Immanuel Kant’s
legal theory and account of fiduciary relations in The Doctrine of Right,2 we
show that a state’s assumption of sovereign administrative powers places
it in a fiduciary relationship with its people. The state-subject fiduciary
relationship can be understood as a relationship mediated by legality only
if the state is precluded from exploiting its position to set unilaterally the
terms of its relationship with its subjects. The fiduciary principle authorizes
states to exercise power on behalf of their people, but subject to strict
limitations flowing from the Kantian idea that agents are to be treated as
ends always (the principle of noninstrumentalization) and the republican
idea that persons are not to be subject to arbitrary power (the principle of
nondomination).
By reframing human rights as legal entitlements grounded in the state-
subject fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary theory provides a fresh perspec-
tive. Human rights under the fiduciary theory are relational and institutional
because they respond to the threats that arise from the relational interac-
tions between public institutions and the people they serve. They are legal
and nonpositivist because they constitute necessary conditions of legal order
under a Kantian theory of right. They are practical in that they take seriously
the rights enshrined in the leading international human rights conventions.
Because human rights under the fiduciary theory are necessary to guarantee
every person’s enjoyment of secure and equal freedom, they are aspirational
and universal in scope. But they are also deliberative in that they are amenable
to refinement through democratic deliberation.
This article develops the fiduciary theory of human rights in several stages.
We begin by reviewing briefly the emergence of international human rights
law during the postwar era and consider how the international community’s
failure to adopt a unifying philosophical theory of human rights has under-
mined efforts to specify determinate, justiciable, and cross-cultural human
rights. We then suggest that the leading contemporary accounts of human
rights—including those advanced by Alan Gewirth, John Rawls, and Joseph
Raz—do not provide satisfactory answers to central questions of human
rights theory. As an alternative to these accounts, we defend the fiduciary
theory of human rights by showing how it can clarify the character, scope,
and content of international human rights law.
II. DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Anxious to move beyond the humanitarian calamities of World War II, state
parties to the United Nations (U.N.) committed to work together to achieve
2. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 98–99 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991)
(1797).
The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights 303
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”3 Under the direction of the U.N. General Assembly, the Human
Rights Commission endeavored to generate an international consensus re-
garding human rights through the preparation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR).4 Although the UDHR affirmed “the inherent
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family,”5 it did not propose a philosophical justification for human rights.
Instead, the UDHR catalogued particular rights accepted throughout the
world in an attempt to establish “a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations.”6 The commission’s effort to generate a broad
consensus regarding the international salience and basic content of human
rights was a resounding success: the General Assembly adopted the UDHR
by a vote of forty-eight in favor and none opposed, with eight abstentions,7
and the UDHR’s thirty articles continue to be recognized worldwide as an
authoritative statement of human rights.
Even during the UDHR’s drafting process, human rights advocates rec-
ognized that the declaration’s moral consensus regarding human rights was
only a first step. For human rights to be meaningful in practice, states would
also have to accept and implement these rights as genuine legal obligations.
International and regional organizations set out to craft multilateral human
rights conventions and to design complementary institutional frameworks
to bridge the gap between moral consensus and domestic implementation.
At the international level, these efforts generated an impressive series of
international agreements, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR);8 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);9 and the Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT).10 International agencies such as the U.N. Human Rights Commis-
sion, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees began monitoring state compliance with these
and other agreements. Regional bodies such as the Organization of Amer-
ican States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Council of Europe
adopted additional regional human rights agreements, complemented by
3. U.N. Charter, arts. 55(c), 56.
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
5. Id. at pmbl.
6. Id.
7. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 169–170 (2001).
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E,
95–2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
9. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S.23 [hereinafter ICESCR].
10. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
CAT].
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their own investigatory commissions and judicial tribunals.11 This wave of
convention drafting, ratification, and institutionalization strengthened hu-
man rights as binding legal norms without clarifying the philosophical basis
for human rights’ legal authority.12
The past several decades have witnessed a shift in attention from the
drafting and ratification of treaty instruments to the implementation and
enforcement of international human rights law. Human rights norms have
been enforced through a variety of political mechanisms, including diplo-
matic and economic sanctions, restrictions on state participation in inter-
national organizations, and even humanitarian intervention. International,
regional, and municipal courts have also assumed an increasingly promi-
nent role in the enforcement of human rights, but they have struggled to
interpret and apply the vague language of human rights conventions. In the
absence of an underlying theory of human rights, basic questions regard-
ing the scope and content of international human rights law have proven
to be deeply controversial, fueling skepticism about international human
rights law and subverting the modern human rights movement’s universalist
ambitions.13
Until recently, for example, the prohibition against state-sponsored tor-
ture was widely viewed as one of the most well-established and least con-
troversial principles of international human rights law, having been incor-
porated in the UDHR, ICCPR, and CAT, as well as in a host of regional
agreements and municipal laws. The international community has defined
the prohibition against torture with unusual specificity by spelling out sev-
eral discrete elements in the CAT.14 Yet, notwithstanding these apparent
advantages, the torture prohibition’s definition, universality, and legal au-
thority remain controversial. In recent years, the U.S. government has chal-
lenged the prohibition against torture by employing and later defending
“enhanced” interrogation techniques such as waterboarding, prolonged
sleep deprivation, and hanging by the wrists.15
11. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Organization of African Unity, African
[Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5.
12. See Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 281 (2007)
(observing that by May 2006, “six core international human rights treaties” had “a truly im-
pressive 85% ratification rate”).
13. See Charles Beitz, What Human Rights Mean, 132 DAEDELUS 36, 37 (2003); Allen
Buchanan, Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order, 14 LEGAL THEORY 39,
40–41 (2008).
14. CAT, supra note 10, art. 1(1) (defining torture to mean “any act by which severe pain
and suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for [various]
purposes . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”).
15. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Necessity, and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 235–236
& n.3 (2007).
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Critics of enhanced interrogation techniques have struggled to explain
why these practices should be considered human rights violations when
the CAT fails to provide straightforward answers to many important ques-
tions regarding the torture prohibition’s scope. For example, how should
the international community determine whether an individual’s “pain and
suffering” are sufficiently “severe” as to constitute “torture”?16 Are states
prohibited from employing torture under circumstances of perceived ne-
cessity?17 If states have not ratified the CAT and other human rights con-
ventions, are they nonetheless prohibited from engaging in acts of torture?
As the international community continues to debate these questions, it has
become increasingly apparent that the prohibition against torture lacks a
coherent theoretical foundation capable of delimiting its scope. Moreover,
judicial efforts to define human rights norms with precision are likely to re-
main highly controversial unless those efforts can be grounded in a broader
theory of human rights amenable to judicial inquiry.
In a sense, international human rights law has become a victim of its own
success. As Allen Buchanan observes, “[t]he more seriously the interna-
tional legal system takes the protection of human rights and the more teeth
this commitment has, the more problematic the lack of a credible public
justification for human-rights norms becomes.”18 Looking to the future, the
legal and political legitimacy of international human rights will depend in
no small part upon the principled specification of human rights norms. To
achieve this objective, international human rights law must develop a more
rigorous theory of human rights—one capable of distinguishing authentic
human rights, determining who may claim human rights violations against
whom, and making human rights effective as justiciable legal rights. Indeed,
after decades of relative neglect, there is a growing awareness within the
human rights community that international law cannot achieve all three
elements of its human rights agenda—transnational application, binding
legal effect, and specification—without re-engaging the fundamental philo-
sophical questions of human rights theory.19
16. CAT, supra note 10, art. 1(1).
17. See John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad, in TORTURE
145, 158 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (“If torture provides the last remaining chance to save
lives in imminent peril, the necessity defense should be available to justify the interrogators’
conduct.”).
18. Buchanan, supra note 13, at 41; see also CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS
xi (2009) (“[A]lthough the idea and language of human rights have become increasingly
prominent in public discourse, it has not become more clear what kinds of objects human
rights are supposed to be, why we should believe that people have them, or what follows from
this belief for political practice.”).
19. See, e.g., BEITZ, IDEA, supra note 18, at xi–xii; JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 53 (2d ed. 2007); L.W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS 1–14 (1987); Joseph
Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations, March 2007, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No.
14/2007, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (John Tasioulis & Samantha Besson eds.,
forthcoming 2010); Buchanan, supra note 13, at 44; Michael Freeman, The Philosophical Foun-
dations of Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 491, 491 (1994); Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical
Foundations of Human Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 201 (1998).
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III. IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
To be credible, a general theory of human rights must offer principled
answers (or at least guidance) to certain fundamental questions regarding
the basis, character, and scope of human rights. These questions include
the following:
 In what sense are human rights rights?
 Do human rights constitute legal rights, as distinguished from moral or political
rights?
 What is the relationship between human rights and state lawmaking authority?
 Do human rights generate duties for both state and nonstate actors?
 How does the theory provide guidance for identifying human rights and clarifying
the scope of those rights?
 Do human rights generate positive duties, such as a duty to provide education, in
addition to negative duties of noninterference?
 If human rights derive from the inherent human dignity of the individual, as is
often supposed, can they apply to certain classes of individuals (such as children)
and to collectivities or groups (such as indigenous peoples)?
 Are human rights culturally relative or universal?
These issues rank among the most pressing and vexing in contemporary
theoretical debates concerning human rights. They are also matters of im-
mense practical importance for the future development of international
human rights law.
As we have seen, the UDHR and subsequent human rights conventions
were never intended to provide a full-fledged philosophical justification
for human rights. At most, human rights conventions offer a few scattered
philosophical fragments. For example, the UDHR declares that “[a]ll hu-
man beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”20 The U.N.
Charter characterizes human rights as “fundamental” and links them to
“the dignity and worth of the human person” and the “the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small.”21 The ICCPR and ICESCR
similarly purport to “derive” their schedules of rights “from the inherent
dignity of the human person.”22 To the extent that these instruments share
a common vision of human rights (however imperfect and incomplete),
it is one that emphasizes human beings’ freedom and equal dignity as a
basis for international legal obligation. None of the leading human rights
conventions explains precisely what the “inherent dignity of the human per-
son” means, however, nor do they explain how particular rights might be
“derived” from any particular conception of human dignity. For answers to
these and other important questions regarding human rights, international
20. UDHR, supra note 4, art. 1.
21. U.N. Charter, supra note 3, pmbl.
22. ICCPR, supra note 8, pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 9, pmbl.
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law must look beyond these agreements to the complementary insights of
moral and political philosophy.
Most theorists have grounded human rights in common values or at-
tributes of humanity. For Locke, human rights represent the inalienable
rights that all humanity enjoys by divine endowment in the prepolitical
“state of nature” and retain thereafter upon entry into civil society.23 In
contrast, Kant derives individual entitlements from a theory of freedom ac-
cording to which every individual has the right to as much freedom as can
be reconciled with a like freedom enjoyed by others.24 As we discuss in Part
IV, human rights on the Kantian account reflect persons’ moral capacity as
agents to place others under legal obligations. Critics have complained that
such efforts to derive human rights from first principles rely on contestable
assumptions regarding the essential character of human nature.25 Nonethe-
less, many contemporary human rights theorists such as John Finnis, James
Griffin, and Michael Perry continue to insist that human rights cannot be
fully understood or specified without recourse to a foundationalist justifica-
tion.26
One prominent foundationalist theory is Alan Gewirth’s principle of
generic consistency. Drawing on the Kantian tradition, Gewirth argues that
human rights follow analytically from the idea that human freedom pro-
vides “necessary conditions of human action.”27 Gewirth observes that the
very concept of human freedom presupposes human purposiveness, which
in turn presupposes an agent’s capacity to set her own purposes and make
judgments about the good (i.e., the moral, philosophical, or religious doc-
trine she wishes to affirm and pursue). Once an agent recognizes that she
is able to set her own purposes and make judgments about the good, she
must accept that her “freedom and well-being are necessary”28 for purpo-
sive action and that she has a right to these generic features of successful
action.29 Because others also possess agency, the agent “must admit, on pain
of self-contradiction,”30 that others have rights to freedom and well-being.31
Gewirth’s principle of generic consistency has not escaped criticism.
Joseph Raz disputes Gewirth’s assertion that “freedom is a necessary condi-
tion of human purposeful action,” noting that slaves act purposefully with-
out enjoying freedom.32 In addition, even if Gewirth’s principle of generic
23. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 4–11 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., 1952) (1690).
24. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 2.
25. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 19, at 494; Shestack, supra note 19, at 208.
26. See John Finnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198, 210–213 (1980); James Griffin,
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2008); Michael J. Perry, The IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES (1998).
27. GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 20.
28. Alan Gewirth, The Epistemology of Human Rights, 1 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 14, 15 (1984).
29. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 63–64 (1978).
30. Id. at 26.
31. Gewirth, Epistemology, supra note 28, at 17.
32. Id. at 4.
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consistency were persuasive as a theory of moral obligation, it would re-
main incomplete because it fails to elucidate human rights’ legal character.
On Gewirth’s account, human rights could conceivably bind agents morally
without imposing any correlative legal duty.
Another influential tradition in human rights theory draws on John
Rawls’s practical political philosophy of human rights. Instead of seeking
to deduce rights analytically from fundamental assumptions about human
nature, Rawls argues that rights claims can be grounded in a political con-
ception of justice based on an “overlapping consensus” between rival social,
cultural, and religious traditions.33 The representatives of peoples from
behind the veil of ignorance will agree that certain minimum norms (in-
cluding human rights) are constitutive of a decent or well-ordered political
order, and so it is unnecessary to reach agreement on the particular social,
cultural, or religious considerations that ground human rights. Many hu-
man rights theorists have found this political conception of human rights
appealing not only because it mediates ideological conflict and addresses
concerns about cultural relativism but also because it furnishes a persuasive
positive theory for the development of international human rights law. As
James Nickel observes, “[p]ostwar efforts to formulate international human
rights have gone forward despite obvious and persistent philosophical and
ideological divisions.”34
Efforts to ground human rights in political conceptions of justice or
contingent social practices have foundered, however, on a common prob-
lem: the idea of an overlapping consensus, without more, does not specify
the scope or legal implications of human rights nor even why they should
be thought to have legal rather than moral or political implications. As
the prohibition against torture illustrates, the mere fact that virtually all
states have recognized a particular human right often tells us little about
the scope or legal consequences of the right. For international courts and
other institutions charged with interpreting human rights, it is not enough
to identify some norms as human rights; they must also be able to define
human rights’ scope and explain their legal consequences. As presently
constituted, however, the political conceptions of human rights defended
by Rawls and others do not enable them to do this.
Responding to Rawls and Gewirth, Raz dismisses human rights theory
generally as a field “rife with hollow hypocrisy” and “infected with self-
serving cynicism and . . . self-deception.”35 According to Raz, human rights
are not “grounded in a fundamental moral concern” such as inherent moral
33. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 42, 46, 68 (Stephen Shute &
Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
34. NICKEL, supra note 19, at 7–8. For a theory that combines Rawls’s political conception
of human rights with foundationalism, see JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 41 (2d ed. 2003); Donnelly, Relative Universality, supra note 12, at 15.
35. Raz, Human Rights, supra note 19, at 19.
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equality or the necessary preconditions for a just political order.36 In Raz’s
view, human rights are similar to all other rights in that they are protective of
individual interests but are different in that their legality rests on the agree-
ment of states to honor them.37 Human rights operate in the international
sphere insofar as states that honor them are entitled to noninterference
by other states. In this sense, human rights are grounded in interests but
ultimately serve to govern claims of sovereignty.
Raz’s positivist, interest-based theory denies many core principles of the
postwar human rights movement. On Raz’s theory, human rights are not
universal; states may choose for themselves whether particular individual
interests warrant legal protection as human rights. Human rights are never
permanent; they evolve over time in response to “the contingencies of the
current system of international relations.”38 Human rights are neither fun-
damental nor inalienable; states may subordinate even the most essential
individual interests to governmental or commercial objectives. Now, Raz
would condemn on moral grounds state-sanctioned crimes against human-
ity and other atrocities. Nonetheless, the fact that Raz’s theory can exclude
abhorrent practices from consideration as human rights violations raises
serious questions about its practicality as a general theory of international
human rights law.
Some utilitarians also express skepticism about human rights discourse,
arguing that the international community should shift its focus from enforc-
ing individual rights to maximizing global human welfare.39 These criticisms
of human rights theory share a commendable purpose of advancing global
justice on a broad scale. The international community cannot reasonably
develop an agenda for improving the human condition, however, without
elucidating both the ideals to which states should strive and the law’s role
in advancing those ideals. Nor can the international community enforce
human rights effectively without a reasonably clear sense of the content of
the particular rights that merit protection. Plausibly, the international com-
munity’s human rights and global justice projects will both benefit from
a robust theory capable of illuminating human rights’ juridical character,
scope, and authority.
IV. FIDUCIARY STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
We argue here that human rights are best conceived as rights emanating
from a fiduciary relationship that exists between the state and persons sub-
ject to its powers, including citizens, resident aliens, and nonresident aliens.
We begin by adumbrating a Kantian account of fiduciary relations and then
36. Id.
37. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 191 (1986).
38. Raz, Human Rights, supra note 19, at 19.
39. See, e.g., Eric Posner, HumanWelfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (2008).
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apply this account to show that the state and its institutions stand in a fidu-
ciary relationship to the citizens and noncitizens subject to their power.40
The Kantian basis of fiduciary relations is the moral capacity of one person
to place another under legal obligation whenever the former is subject to
the unilateral administrative power of the latter. This moral capacity reflects
Kant’s principle of noninstrumentalization: persons are to be regarded as
ends always, rather than mere means.
Within the fiduciary framework, human rights emerge as entitlements
to be treated in certain ways by public institutions. In particular, public in-
stitutions are duty-bound to secure individuals against arbitrary power by
promoting the republican ideal of nondomination. We see below that the
human rights enshrined in international law provide a normative structure
conducive to nondomination. They are mid-range or intermediary norms
that reside between the amorphous demands of dignity and the concrete
institutionalization of sovereign power, and they are susceptible to modifi-
cation pursuant to democratic deliberation. In short, human rights under
the fiduciary theory are normative consequences of the state’s assumption
of sovereign powers and are thus constitutive of sovereignty’s normative
dimension. A state that fails to satisfy its fiduciary duty to respect human
rights subverts its claim to govern and represent its people as a sovereign
actor.
Put another way, human rights are correlates of the state’s duty to secure
conditions of noninstrumentalization and nondomination. We see below
that instrumentalization and domination are distinct, but both reflect an
ideal of independent agency. Independent agency is the capacity of an agent
to exercise her powers of self-determination without wrongful interference
(instrumentalization) or the threat of such interference (domination). For
ease of reference, we sometimes refer to the conjunction of noninstrumen-
talization and nondomination as simply “independence,” though at various
points we treat the two ideas separately. Thus the state’s duty to secure
conditions of both noninstrumentalization and nondomination is a duty to
secure conditions of independence.
The fiduciary conception of human rights has numerous characteristics
that we outline now and elaborate below. It is relational in that it justifies and
explains human rights on the basis of a state-subject fiduciary relationship.
It is institutional in that it posits human rights as norms that respond to the
power assumed and threats posed by public institutions. It is legal in that its
key normative precepts are taken from Kant’s theory of right. It is nonposi-
tivist in that it reveals human rights as the progeny of a necessary connection
between law and morality. It is republican in that the structure of fiduciary re-
lations, including the state-subject relation, expresses the general structure
40. For discussion of the fiduciary theory’s cosmopolitan application to noncitizens as well
as citizens, see Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE. J.
INT’L L. 331, 359, 380–382 (2009).
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of relations of nondomination when one party holds discretionary power
over another (such as the state’s power to establish legal order on behalf of
legal subjects). It is practical in the sense that it takes seriously the current
practice of international human rights law, including the extensive schedule
of rights set out in the so-called International Bill of Human Rights (the
UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR). The fiduciary conception is also universal
and aspirational in that it aspires to facilitate universally relations of non-
instrumentalization and nondomination (or independence), since these
relations are necessary to every person’s enjoyment of secure and equal
freedom. And finally, it is deliberative in that international human rights law
is viewed as provisional and susceptible to revision in light of democratic
deliberation.
Fiduciary relationships include trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal,
director-corporation, lawyer-client, and parent-child relations. They arise
from circumstances in which one party (the fiduciary) holds discretionary
power of an administrative nature over the legal or practical interests of
another party (the beneficiary), and the beneficiary is vulnerable to the
fiduciary’s power in that he is unable, either as a matter of fact or law, to
exercise the entrusted power.41 Discretionary power of an administrative
nature is other-regarding, purposive, and institutional. It is other-regarding
in the strictly factual sense that another person is involved; a landowner’s
administrative power over her land is not other-regarding, whereas a direc-
tor’s administrative power over a corporation is. The fiduciary’s power is
purposive in that it is held for limited purposes, such as an agent’s power
to contract on behalf of her principal. Lastly, the power is institutional in
that it must be situated within a legally permissible institution, such as the
family or the corporation, but not, for example, within a kidnapping ring.
The kidnapper is not a lawful fiduciary because kidnapping is premised on
wrongful interference and domination. The law seeks to extinguish rather
than regulate relationships of this kind.
Beneficiaries are peculiarly vulnerable in that they generally are unable to
protect themselves or their entrusted interests against an abuse of fiduciary
power. In many fiduciary relationships of private law (e.g., lawyer-client,
agent-principal), the fiduciary is empowered to act on the beneficiary’s
behalf so as to change the beneficiary’s legal position, and the things he
is empowered to do for the beneficiary (e.g., defend a suit, sign a con-
tract) are things the beneficiary is legally entitled to do for herself. In other
cases, the vulnerability is of a different kind because the beneficiary cannot
in principle exercise the fiduciary’s power. Artificial persons, for instance,
41. One of us has defended this conception of fiduciary relationships as well as a fiduciary
conception of the state. See Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31
QUEEN’S L.J. 259 (2005). We also argue that administrative law rests on fiduciary foundations.
See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006);
Evan Fox-Decent, Democratizing Common Law Constitutionalism, 55 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming
2010).
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such as corporations, cannot act except through their agents or represen-
tatives. But most relevant for present purposes are fiduciary relationships
involving multiple beneficiaries subject to the same fiduciary power, such
as pension fund beneficiaries with competing claims on the same fund.42
In these cases, the contending beneficiaries are not entitled to exercise the
fiduciary’s power because no person can be judge and party to the same
cause.
Although the hallmark fiduciary duty of a trustee to a discrete beneficiary
is a duty of loyalty, the content of this duty necessarily changes if multiple
classes of beneficiaries are involved. The fiduciary duty necessarily becomes
one of fairness or evenhandedness as between beneficiaries, and reasonable-
ness in the sense that the fiduciary must have due regard for the distinct
beneficiaries’ separate interests.43 In all cases, the fundamental fiduciary
duty is to exercise the entrusted power exclusively for the other-regarding
purposes for which it is held.
Kant provides a noninstrumental account of the moral basis of fiduciary
obligations in an argument concerning the duties that parents owe their
children, duties that arise as a consequence of the parents’ unilateral act of
procreation:
[C]hildren, as persons, have by their procreation an original innate (not
acquired) right to the care of their parents until they are able to look after
themselves, and they have this right directly on the basis of principle (lege),
that is, without any special act being required to establish this right.
For the offspring is a person. . . . [I]t is quite correct and even necessary Idea
to regard the act of procreation as one by which we have brought a person
into the world without his consent and on our own initiative, for which deed
the parents incur an obligation to make the child content with his condition
so far as they can. They cannot destroy their child . . . since they have brought
not merely a worldly being but a citizen of the world into a condition which
cannot now be indifferent to them even just according to concepts of Right.44
To understand Kant’s argument, we need to review briefly his theory
of right (or legality), which includes a very specific conception of the
idea of innate right. For Kant, legal rights embody our moral capacity for
putting others under legal obligations and are either acquired or innate.45
42. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Hyman, [2000] 2 All E.R. 331 (C.A.), aff’d
[2002] 1 A.C. 408 (H.L.) (U.K.).
43. See id.; Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245 (Can.); P.D. FINN,
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 59–74 (1977).
44. See KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 2, at 98–99 (emphasis in original) (foot-
note omitted). It is settled law in Canada that parents owe their children fiduciary duties. See
M.(K.) v. M.(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R 6 (Can.). For an argument that U.S. family law should follow
suit, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995).
45. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 2, at 63. The summary of Kant’s discussion
of rights in the text refers exclusively to coercively enforceable legal rights and their correl-
ative legal obligations. Kant is not referring to unenforceable ethical duties arising from the
The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights 313
Property and contractual entitlements are acquired rights because some
act is required on the part of the right-holder for her to acquire them.
An innate right, on the other hand, “is that which belongs to everyone by
nature, independently of any act that would establish a right.”46 Persons
have one, and only one, innate right, which all possess equally by virtue of
their shared humanity—that is, the right to as much freedom as can coexist
with the freedom of everyone else. Freedom, Kant explains, is simply “in-
dependence from being constrained by another’s choice.”47 It follows that
in a world where interaction with others is unavoidable, law must enshrine
and secure rights within a regime of equal freedom in which no party can
unilaterally impose the terms of interaction on another.
Rights under Kant’s theory protect the freedom and dignity of agents
rather than their welfare or interests.48 Correlative duties arise from rights
because their absence would signal a deprivation of freedom or an insult
to dignity. That a breach of duty might set back interests is irrelevant to
whether there is a duty in the first place. Under Kant’s legal theory, inquiry
into liability addresses whether there has been a breach of duty, and this
inquiry is categorically distinct from the subsequent inquiry into damages
which tracks the effect of the breach on the relevant interests. The dis-
tinction between harms and wrongs illuminates the point. An actor can
wrong without harming, such as when she invades your privacy by reading
your junk mail without permission. And she can harm without wronging, as
might occur if she launched a business to compete with yours. While it is
true that many rights (including human rights) protect important interests,
for Kant they are properly designated as rights only if their infringement
would constitute a breach of duty (understood as a deprivation of freedom
or an insult to dignity) and regardless of whether the purported breach
leads to a setting back of interests.
Consider now Kant’s claim that children have an innate and legal right to
their parents’ care. To connect the parent’s duty to the child’s right, Kant
points to the act of procreation, an act that brings a helpless and vulnerable
child into the world without the child’s consent. When parents unilaterally
create a person who cannot survive without their support, the child’s innate
moral capacity to place the parents under obligation is triggered to ensure
the child’s security. The parents’ freedom to procreate can thus coexist with
the child’s right to security from the perils of a condition to which she never
categorical imperative under his doctrine of virtue, such as the duty of beneficence. For a
discussion of the intimate relationship in Kant between legality and coercion, see Arthur Rip-
stein, Authority and Coercion, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (2004).
46. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 2, at 63.
47. Id.
48. Cf. SUMNER, supra note 19 (arguing that rights are best conceived as protected choices,
but grounded on consequentialist considerations). But see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREE-
DOM 165–192 (1986) (defending the interest theory under which rights protect interests). For
subsequent defense of the interest theory, see Andrei Marmor, On the Limits of Rights, 16 LAW &
PHIL. 1 (1997).
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consented. The child is treated as a person worthy of respect and not as a
thing the parents can destroy or abandon.
As persons, children cannot be treated as mere means or objects of their
parents’ freedom to procreate. Rather, they are beings who, by virtue of their
moral personhood, have dignity, and dignity proscribes regarding them as
if they were things. By the same token, legal personality and the idea of
dignity intrinsic to it supply the moral basis of the beneficiary’s right to
the fiduciary obligation. A relationship in which the fiduciary has unilateral
administrative power over the beneficiary’s interests can be understood
as a relationship mediated by law only if the fiduciary (like the parent)
is precluded from exploiting his position to set unilaterally the terms of
his relationship with the beneficiary. The fiduciary principle renders the
beneficiary’s entrusted interests immune to the fiduciary’s appropriation,
because those interests are treated as inviolate embodiments of the benefi-
ciary’s dignity as a person. In other words, the fiduciary principle authorizes
the fiduciary to exercise power on the beneficiary’s behalf but subject to
strict limitations arising from the beneficiary’s vulnerability to the fiduciary’s
power and his intrinsic worth as a person. Bearing in mind the constitutive
features of fiduciary relations and Kant’s theory of right, we are now in a
position to explain how the state and its institutions stand in a fiduciary
relationship to their people.
The state’s legislative, judicial, and executive branches all assume discre-
tionary power of an administrative nature over the citizens and noncitizens
affected by their power. For example, the state assumes discretionary au-
thority to announce and enforce law over everyone within its territory. The
legislative, executive, and judicial powers entailed by sovereignty, in their
own familiar ways, are institutional, purpose-laden, and other-regarding.
Furthermore, legal subjects, as private parties, are not entitled to exercise
public powers. For this reason, legal subjects are peculiarly vulnerable to
public authority, notwithstanding their ability within democracies to par-
ticipate in democratic processes. It follows that the state’s assumption of
sovereign powers—public powers that private parties are not entitled to
exercise—places it in a fiduciary relationship with its people.
The fiduciary model compares favorably to the social contract theory
relied on by many human rights scholars.49 Like social contract theory, the
fiduciary view appeals to a familiar kind of legal relationship from private
law, but with the advantage that the state-subject fiduciary relationship is
actual, whereas the social contract is a fiction. The state’s fiduciary duties
are therefore actual rather than hypothetical.
Perhaps the most salient advantage of the fiduciary theory, however, is
that it draws on a legal relationship expressly designed to govern rela-
tions of proclaimed authority involving nonconsensual coercion, such as
49. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); FERNANDO R. TESO´N, A PHILOSOPHY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998).
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the parent-child relationship. These relationships can be rightful (i.e., con-
sistent with the secure and equal freedom of both parties) if and only if
the law rather than the power-holder sets the terms of the relationship.
The fiduciary principle does just this; it is the law’s means of regulating
the possession and use of entrusted power over those who are not able or
entitled to exercise it. Because the problem of justifying the state is precisely
the problem of articulating the conditions under which the state can exer-
cise nonconsensual coercion, the fiduciary model is well suited to the task.
Rather than fudge or wish away the nonconsensual nature of state authority,
as the contractarian tradition tends to do, the fiduciary theory posits a con-
crete normative structure that aspires to make rightful the possession and
exercise of explicitly nonconsensual sovereign power. While social contract
theories rely on (the fiction of) consent, the fiduciary theory is shaped by
its absence. But the fiduciary theory remains staunchly democratic because
it insists that every person must have an equal opportunity to participate
in political processes that ultimately culminate in the state’s possession and
exercise of nonconsensual coercive power.50
Our suggestion is that the state’s overarching fiduciary duty to citizens
and noncitizens is to establish a regime of secure and equal freedom under
the rule of law.51 Human rights provide the blueprint or structure of this
regime. That is, the fiduciary principle authorizes the state to secure legal
order, but subject to fiduciary constraints that include human rights. Under
this theory, the state’s sovereignty to govern domestically and represent
its people internationally consists in its fiduciary authorization to do so.
And because this authorization is constrained and constituted by a duty to
respect, protect, and implement human rights, state sovereignty is likewise
constrained and constituted by human rights.52
The idea of a state-subject fiduciary relationship reveals the relational
character of the fiduciary conception of human rights. In what follows,
we flesh out the other features of the fiduciary model mentioned above,
beginning with its institutional nature.
50. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 40, at 356–360 (distinguishing the fiduciary theory
from the contractarian tradition).
51. Cf. JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 283 (1998) [“public
authority is not merely a moral liberty but essentially a responsibility (a liberty coupled with, and
ancillary to, a duty).”]. For insightful discussion of Finnis’s “duty to govern” and its relationship
to authority (the right to govern) and legal obligation (the duty to obey the law), see Leslie
Green, The Duty to Govern, 13 LEGAL THEORY 165 (2007).
52. The fiduciary theory therefore satisfies Jon Mahoney’s criterion that “a liberal concep-
tion of human rights must . . . justify the claim that human rights (a) limit and (b) authorize
limited exercises in political power.” Jon Mahoney, Liberalism and the Moral Basis for Human Rights,
27 LAW & PHIL. 151, 152 (2008). An advantage of the fiduciary theory is that it demystifies
the role of human rights within a framework of limited authorization. Human rights denote
limits through the obligations they impose, but rights (e.g., all negative rights to noninterfer-
ence) do not typically imply authorization. A separate principle is required for purposes of
authorization, and in contexts of nonconsensual coercion, the best candidate is the fiduciary
principle.
316 EVAN FOX-DECENT AND EVAN J. CRIDDLE
The fiduciary model is institutional in two senses. First, as shown above,
it is institutional in the constitutive sense that fiduciary relations must arise
within legal institutions such as the family or corporation—frameworks in
which the relationship is not defined by domination or wrongful interfer-
ence with the vulnerable party. Second, the fiduciary theory is institutional
in that it does not rely on preinstitutional and timeless natural rights, which
are sometimes said to ground human rights. A. John Simmons provides an
especially clear account of the preinstitutional view:
[H]uman rights are possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their
humanity. . . . Human rights are those natural rights that are innate and that
cannot be lost (i.e., that cannot be given away, forfeited, or taken away). Hu-
man rights, then, will have the properties of universality, independence (from
social and legal recognition), naturalness, inalienability, non-forfeitability, and
imprescriptability. Only so understood will an account of human rights cap-
ture the central idea of rights that can always be claimed by any human
being.53
Charles Beitz refers to this account as the “orthodox” view of human
rights.54 As both he and Simmons observe, the orthodox view is inconsis-
tent with a wide range of rights recognized by international human rights
law, since these rights require or presuppose legal institutions. Consider,
for example, rights enshrined in the ICCPR to due process (arts. 9, 14, 15),
unionization (art. 22), protection of family life (art. 23), political partici-
pation (art. 25), and equality under the law (art. 26). Rights found in the
ICESCR are even less amenable to the orthodox view. The ICESCR includes
entitlements to work under “just and favourable conditions” (arts. 6–8),
social security (art. 9), an adequate standard of living (art. 11), health (art.
12), education (art. 13), and enjoyment of cultural life (art. 15). These
rights cannot exist in a prepolitical state of nature devoid of public institu-
tions, nor is it plausible to think that they existed in premodern societies,
when the institutions necessary for their realization did not exist.
Rather than denying, as some philosophers do, that these rights are hu-
man rights,55 the fiduciary theory takes their institutional preconditions
to heart because under this theory human rights are viewed as normative
demands arising from the subjection of persons to public institutions. In
53. A. JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
185 (2001) (citing inter alia Alan Gewirth, The Epistemology of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS
1, 3 (E.F. Paul, J. Paul & F.D. Miller, Jr., eds., 1986)) (other citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
54. Charles Beitz, Human Rights and the Law of Peoples, in THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORAL-
ITY AND THE DISTANT NEEDY 193, 196 (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2004); see also id. at 197–198
(citing Maurice Cranston as a proponent of this view: MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN
RIGHTS? 65–71 (1973)).
55. See, e.g., Maurice Cranston, Are There Any Human Rights? 112 DAEDALUS 1 (1983); FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW, supra note 26, at 214–215.
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modern industrial societies, these include the institutions of private prop-
erty and markets as well as legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies.
International human rights law protects individuals against threats of in-
strumentalization and domination made possible by the existence of these
institutions.56 Because these and other institutions are liable to change
over time and vary across jurisdictions, there is no reason to think that
the present catalogue of human rights is complete or invariant. The cat-
alogue may change because threats to agency and dignity may change or
because contemporary threats may be newly apprehended by human rights
law, as the proliferation of instruments protective of vulnerable groups at-
tests.57 What is provisionally fixed within the fiduciary theory, however, is
a commitment affirmed on legal grounds to noninstrumentalization and
nondomination.
The legal character of the fiduciary model derives from its reliance on
Kant’s theory of right.58 The rights available under this theory are enforce-
able claim-rights, and in this context they correlate to the state’s duty to
respect, protect, and implement human rights. Just as a child’s right to
parental care is correlative to the parent’s duty to provide support, the legal
subject’s human right to x is correlative to the state’s duty to guarantee x. In
both cases the fiduciary principle triggers the duty. And in both cases the
reason for imposing a duty on the power-holder is the same as the reason
for acknowledging the beneficiary’s right: recognition of the right and the
duty are necessary to avoid subjecting the beneficiary to instrumentalizing
or dominating power. Right and duty coalesce to protect the dignity and
independence of the vulnerable party.
One of the advantages of relying on a legal conception of human rights
is that it treats international human rights law on its own terms, within
its own self-image, as law rather than as merely the aspirational goals of
liberal political morality. The fiduciary theory does so by offering a distinc-
tively legal explanation of the state’s duty to guarantee human rights. We
argue elsewhere that the fiduciary model explains the peremptory status
of jus cogens norms, such as the prohibitions against torture, slavery, and
genocide.59 As a matter of international law, states must comply with these
56. For discussion of rights as guarantees against “standard threats,” see HENRY SHUE, BASIC
RIGHTS (2d ed. 1996). See also THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 64 (2002)
(arguing that human rights are “moral claims on the organization of one’s society”).
57. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979); Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, G.A. Res.
45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 18, 1990); Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13,
2007) [hereinafter Indigenous Peoples Declaration].
58. Compare JU¨RGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 104–11 (1996) (arguing for
a “legal” conception of human rights, but where “legal” is intended to denote a positivist
detachment from morality).
59. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 40.
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norms whether they consent to them or not. The fiduciary theory explains
the nonderogability of such norms on grounds that their violation could
never be consistent with the state’s fiduciary duty to secure legal order,
which includes the provision of fundamental equal security under the rule
of law. Practices that arbitrarily kill or systematically dominate a state’s sub-
jects, as well as practices that infringe key aspects of the rule of law (such
as corrupt adjudication), are prohibited by jus cogens under the fiduciary
theory.
The fiduciary model also points to three substantive desiderata of dero-
gable and nonderogable human rights. The fiduciary principle’s authoriza-
tion of state power requires the state and its institutions to act for the good
of the people rather than for the good of its officials or rulers. The first
desideratum is therefore a principle of integrity: human rights must have as
their object the good of the legal subject rather than the good of the state’s
officials. Second is a principle of formal moral equality: the fiduciary state
owes a duty of fairness or evenhandedness to legal subjects because they
are separate persons subject to the same fiduciary power. Human rights,
therefore, must regard individuals as equal cobeneficiaries of the fiduciary
state. Third is a principle of solicitude: human rights must be solicitous of the
legal subject’s legitimate interests because those interests, like the interests
of the child vis-a`-vis the parent, are vulnerable to the state’s nonconsensual
coercive power. These desiderata offer a substantive justification of inter-
national human rights law, a justification that operates independently of
whether states have ratified particular conventions. Freedom of expression
and the right to work, for example, have the good of the subject as their
object and are consistent with the principles of formal moral equality and
solicitude.
These principles reveal that the fiduciary theory, as a legal conception of
human rights, is normatively substantial but metaphysically thin. The theory
is normatively substantial because principles such as integrity, formal moral
equality, and solicitude all have content that facilitates the specification and
justification of human rights norms. But the theory is metaphysically thin
because it does not affirm nor presuppose a comprehensive conception of
the good.60 Nor does the fiduciary theory affirm or imply that individuals
are in fact moral equals. As a legal conception, the fiduciary theory merely
insists that for public institutions to act legally, they must regard individuals
as if they were moral equals, because public institutions must regard all
individuals as equal cobeneficiaries of legal order. Public institutions must
adopt this attitude because the fiduciary principle authorizes the state to
secure legal order on behalf of every agent subject to it. Each agent is an
equally valid subject of the fiduciary authorization of public authority, and
because the fiduciary principle is a principle of legality, it must treat like
60. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED
PAPERS 421, 424–425 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
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cases alike.61 The fiduciary principle therefore has no capacity to discrimi-
nate arbitrarily between agents who, by virtue of the state-subject fiduciary
relationship, enjoy equal status vis-a`-vis the state as cobeneficiaries of public
authority. Slavery and arbitrary discrimination are ruled out simply because
the fiduciary principle cannot authorize such practices, which are inconsis-
tent with the fiduciary principle that all agents are entitled to be treated as
equal under the law—none of which presupposes or implies that individuals
actually possess equal moral worth or dignity.
Rawls claims that a “law of peoples” can embrace “hierarchal” as well as
liberal societies as long as the hierarchical societies are “well-ordered.”62
Hierarchical societies are nonliberal in that they are organized by compre-
hensive religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines. Borrowing from Philip
Soper’s Kantian account of law, Rawls asserts that part of what it means for
a hierarchical society to be well-ordered is for it to have a legal system “that
takes impartially into account what it sees not unreasonably as the funda-
mental interests of all members of society.”63 Within this system, judges and
officials must be prepared to listen to dissent and justify their pronounce-
ments. A well-ordered hierarchical society must also respect an abridged
catalogue of “basic” human rights, since its legal system must be capable of
imposing enforceable moral duties on persons within its territory and could
not do so if it violated those rights.64
Rawls argues that the moral presuppositions of well-orderedness are suffi-
ciently thin that some hierarchical societies would be willing to accept them.
The point is to distinguish tyrannical regimes, which cannot be accepted
into the “reasonable society of peoples,” from other nonliberal societies that
can.65 The result is that liberal and (well-ordered) hierarchical societies can
relate to one another on the basis of a stable and overlapping consensus
conducive to a law of peoples.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess either Rawls’s law of
peoples or Soper’s legal theory, four points are worth underscoring. The
first is that the fiduciary theory as a legal conception resembles Rawls’s
theory in that it relies on a Kantian account of the right rather than a com-
prehensive conception of the good. Second, the fiduciary theory is at least
61. Hart acknowledges that “[i]f we attach to a legal system the minimum meaning that
it must consist of general rules . . . this meaning connotes the principle of treating like cases
alike.” H.L.A. HART, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY 49, 81 (1983).
62. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36, 37 (1993). A law of peoples
is a “political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of
international society.” Id.
63. Id. at 51. Rawls draws on PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1984). Soper claims we
have a prima facie obligation to show respect to others who do necessary jobs. Because the
state’s officials do a necessary job when they announce and enforce law, we have a defeasible
obligation to obey the law when they do their job in good faith. To be clear, Soper’s idea of
respect for others is Kantian in a loose sense, but his legal theory is not Kant’s.
64. Rawls, Law of Peoples, supra note 62, at 52.
65. Id. at 37.
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as thin as Rawls’s political conception, since Rawls’s conception trades on
a legal theory alleged to be capable of justifying the imposition of moral
duties. Third, the fiduciary theory explains why rather than assumes that a
well-ordered society cannot discriminate arbitrarily between individuals: it
cannot do so because its institutions are under a fiduciary obligation to
treat people evenhandedly as equal cobeneficiaries of the fiduciary state.
Rather than assuming impartiality as an entrance condition into the “rea-
sonable society of peoples,” the fiduciary theory explains why impartiality
participates directly in the constitution of human rights.
The fourth point is perhaps the most important: both Rawls’s theory and
the fiduciary theory trade on a moral space between preinstitutional natu-
ral rights and conventional rights, a domain we might call the normative
space of legal order. For Rawls, if a state wishes to belong to the “reason-
able society of peoples,” it must be well-ordered; to be well-ordered, it must
have a legal system capable of imposing enforceable moral duties; and a
necessary condition of such a system is that it respect basic human rights.
The requirement to respect human rights flows not from an assumption
that these rights exist in some preinstitutional sense (as Gewirth and others
assert), nor from their stipulation in positive law (as positivists such as Raz
contend), but from the idea that a failure to respect them would subvert a
legal system’s capacity to impose moral duties. Such a failure would thereby
undercut the society’s claim to well-orderedness and membership in the rea-
sonable society of peoples. We see above that the fiduciary theory also relies
on moral requirements internal to legal order rather than preinstitutional
natural rights or positive law. But whereas for Rawls the idea that states must
respect human rights is a hypothetical imperative (if a state wants to be
well-ordered, it must respect human rights),66 under the fiduciary theory
the imperative is categorical: the state must respect human rights because
it has a fiduciary duty to do so.
Many philosophers reject the idea that there is normative space between
natural/moral rights and conventional/legal rights because they take these
two categories to represent watertight compartments exhaustive of the do-
main within which rights operate. The rejection is present in the conse-
quentialist account of rights defended by Wayne Sumner but is also present
in the work of a number of natural rights theorists, including Simmons.67
66. Rawls purports to set aside the jurisprudential question of whether a scheme of rules
must have the structure and content Soper assigns to it to count as a system of law, insisting
that his only interest is in specifying the conditions of well-orderedness for the purpose of
determining membership in a reasonable society of peoples. Id. at 51 n.22. Yet it is just the
structure and content Soper specifies that are alleged to authorize a scheme of rules to impose
enforceable moral duties on the people subject to those rules, an authorization not possessed
by schemes that merely issue commands backed by coercive force. Notwithstanding Rawls’s
protest to the contrary, implicit in his theory of well-orderedness is a commitment to the
nonpositivist idea that legal systems per se, as such and without more, are capable of imposing
enforceable moral duties.
67. SUMNER, supra note 19, at 90–91; SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION, supra note 53, at 186–194.
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Simmons recognizes that Kant’s theory of right complicates the picture.
He admits that Kant can be read to support human rights that require
institutions; our innate right of humanity to equal freedom entitles us to
compel others to leave the state of nature and enter civil society so as to
guarantee secure and equal freedom. But on Simmons’s interpretation,
the natural/conventional paradigm remains intact because the justificatory
work is performed entirely by our innate right of humanity and in abstrac-
tion from the necessary contribution that Kant insists legal institutions make
to the determinacy and security of our rights. Simmons in fact rejects Kant’s
claim that the state’s institutions are morally required. What unites Sum-
ner and Simmons, despite the chasm that separates their substantive moral
theories, is a commitment to the positivist idea that there is no necessary
connection between law and morality; law is viewed as purely conventional,
with no necessary grounding in or connection to morality.
The fiduciary theory, by contrast, affirms a nonpositivist framework in
which law is necessarily connected to morality precisely because law is nec-
essarily institutional. Human rights are the normative consequence of law’s
institutional nature because all legal institutions stand in a fiduciary rela-
tion to the persons subject to them. Human rights, in other words, both
occupy and partially constitute the normative space of legal order and thus
are intrinsic to legality. Because positivists such as Sumner and Simmons
work within a rights paradigm defined by a hard distinction between the
natural and the conventional (a paradigm that implicitly rejects the norma-
tive space of legal order), and because positivism such as theirs dominates
contemporary legal scholarship, it is not surprising that the fiduciary theory
has gone unnoticed.68
Let us consider now the sense in which the fiduciary theory of human
rights is republican. It is republican because the fiduciary principle ap-
plies exclusively to relationships, including the state-subject relationship,
in which the threat of the powerful dominating the vulnerable is always
present and domination is the evil that republicanism opposes. One person
dominates another to the extent that he has the capacity to interfere on an
arbitrary basis in certain choices that the other is in a position to make.69
Domination is exemplified by the master-slave relationship, in which the
master can interfere arbitrarily with the choices of the slave. The master
dominates the slave because she can command the slave with impunity with
68. In reviewing this article, James Nickel has suggested to us that a positivist could contend
that legitimate or rights-respecting law embodies moral requirements, and so the fiduciary
theory is not committed to nonpositivism because it can be interpreted to inform the legitimacy
or rights-respecting conditions of legitimate or rights-respecting law. It is well beyond the scope
of this paper to argue persuasively against this interpretation, but it is at odds with the Kantian
theory of law on which the fiduciary theory rests. For a defense of Kant’s nonpositivist legal
theory, see ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(2009). For defense of the fiduciary theory’s nonpositivist credentials, see Evan Fox-Decent, Is
the Rule of Law Really Indifferent to Human Rights, 27 LAW & PHIL. 533 (2008).
69. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 52 (1997).
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no regard for the interests or opinions of the slave. Crucially, she dominates
the slave whether she interferes with the slave or not. A constitutional legal
authority guided by the rule of law, on the other hand, does not dominate
its subjects. Although law interferes with an individual’s choices by threat-
ening sanctions, the threat of sanctions is not made on an arbitrary basis.
Subjection to the rule of law is thus consistent with the republican ideal of
nondomination and indeed contributes to it, since the rule of law limits the
ability of the powerful to dominate the weak.
Fiduciary relations possess the structure and form that relations of non-
domination must assume whenever one party holds power over another,
since they require the power-holder to act with due regard for the best in-
terests of the beneficiary, taking into account her views and opinions. Philip
Pettit gestures in this direction when he writes that if someone is able to
interfere in my affairs but only on condition that he further my interests
and take my opinions seriously, the power-holder “relates to me, not as a
master, but more in the fashion of an agent who enjoys a power of attor-
ney in my affairs.”70 Agents are fiduciaries, and as such, they are subject to
other-regarding fiduciary duties that make domination impossible from a
legal point of view. The threat of de facto domination is controlled de jure
by the fiduciary principle.
Pettit rightly observes that the “abuse of human rights, and the existence
of a power of such abuse, epitomizes domination; it means that those who
are subject to such abuse live at the mercy of their actual or potential
abusers, and under their effective control.”71 Conditions of nondomination,
then, denote conditions in which the vulnerable are not at the mercy of the
powerful nor subject to abuse. Because the fiduciary theory requires respect
for human rights, it supports a framework of nondomination in which the
human rights of those subject to public power are protected against abuse.
And because the fiduciary theory of human rights explains how respect for
human rights can be demanded as a matter of law, it likewise explains how
nondomination can operate as a legal principle as well as a political ideal.
Under the fiduciary theory, nondomination complements Kant’s princi-
ple of noninstrumentalization in the following way. Whereas noninstrumen-
talization prohibits the state from wrongfully interfering with its subjects,
nondomination bars the state from holding arbitrary power that ipso facto
would pose a wrongful threat because it could be exercised wrongfully at
any time. In other words, noninstrumentalization controls the actual exer-
cise of power, while nondomination controls the omnipresent threat of its
exercise, which is to say, the terms on which power is held and can be used.
An implication of the control nondomination asserts over the possession
of public power is that public institutions cannot become sectional instru-
ments for treating certain classes of people as mere means to others’ ends.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Philip Pettit, A Republican Law of Peoples, 8 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 70, 88 (2010).
The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights 323
The principle of nondomination embodies institutionally the principle of
noninstrumentalization and shows again why the fiduciary state is under
a legal obligation to treat individuals as moral equals. In sum, the fidu-
ciary theory of human rights is republican because it envisions those rights
as intermediary legal precepts that shield vulnerable persons from both in-
strumentalization and domination, thereby providing for their independent
agency.72
We can now set out the related senses in which the fiduciary theory is
practical, universal, and aspirational. It is practical because it takes seriously
the practice of international human rights law on its own terms, finding
a place for both dignity and the view that human rights, as Beitz puts it,
“are standards appropriate to the institutions of modern or modernizing
societies coexisting in a global political economy in which human beings
face a series of predictable threats.”73 The normative grounds of such rights
are universal in that they derive from the idea that public institutions must
always relate to the people subject to them on a basis of nondomination and
noninstrumentalization.74 Human rights are the concrete embodiments of
these principles, and as such, they promise the emancipation and indepen-
dence of those who suffer oppression. The fiduciary theory thereby casts
human rights as the aspirational demands of a political program in the
service of the vulnerable.
The final aspect of the theory we sketch is its deliberative character.
Amartya Sen and Allen Buchanan have both sought to ground human rights
in deliberative practices of public reasoning.75 Buchanan, for example, ar-
gues that international human rights institutions have important epistemic
functions in that they contribute to the specification of the content of hu-
man rights norms by both fact-finding and providing a public deliberative
forum for their ongoing development and interpretation.76 These open
and inclusive deliberative practices legitimate human rights in a way that
mitigates the risk of human rights assuming parochial cultural biases. We
endorse this view. While it is well beyond the scope of this article to set
out the appropriate relationship between democratic deliberation and hu-
man rights, we indicate briefly how and why the fiduciary model can bring
democratic deliberation into its fold.
72. For an argument that republicans should “connect the idea of domination to a basic set
of vulnerabilities,” see Simon Hope, Republicanism and Human Rights: A Plausible Combination?,
21 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 367, 379–381 (2008).
73. Beitz, What Human Rights Mean, supra note 13, at 44.
74. We argue elsewhere that the fiduciary principle obligates states to respect not only the
human rights of their own citizens but also the human rights of foreign nationals subject to
state power. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 40. We leave to another day consideration of
the relationship between human rights and citizenship.
75. See Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (2004);
Buchanan, supra note 13.
76. Buchanan, supra note 13, at 61–65.
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Deliberation is required by the idea of a state-subject fiduciary re-
lationship because this relationship is the legal expression of popular
sovereignty—the idea that the state’s sovereignty belongs to the people
subject to sovereign power. A state that engages in inclusive public delib-
eration over human rights, soliciting public input and providing reasoned
justifications for laws and policies, demonstrates an appropriate solicitude
for the legitimate interests of citizens and noncitizens. Conversely, a state
that does not engage in public deliberation and reasoned justification re-
garding human rights ordinarily fails to take seriously the dignity of legal
subjects by reserving for itself the capacity to treat citizens and noncitizens
arbitrarily, raising the specter of domination. Thus, whether or not public
deliberation has epistemic value in the specification of human rights, it per-
forms an indispensable function within the state-subject fiduciary relation as
an expression of the state’s respect for its subjects’ dignity and independent
agency.77
Buchanan summarizes nicely the main procedural constraints under
which deliberation over human rights ought to occur:
[I]nstitutions that contribute to the articulation of human rights norms ought
to provide venues for deliberation in which the authority of good reasons
is recognized, in which credible efforts are made to reduce the risk that
strategic bargaining or raw power will displace rational deliberation, in which
principled contestation of alternative views is encouraged, in which no points
of view are excluded on the basis of prejudicial attitudes toward those who
voice them, and in which conclusions about human rights are consistent with
the foundational idea that there are moral rights that human beings (now)
have, independent of whether they are recognized by any legal system.78
Deliberation under the fiduciary theory would take international human
rights law as its provisional starting point, because the rights enshrined
therein are broadly conducive to independent agency. Deliberative inquiry
would be guided prospectively by the substantive principles that are consti-
tutive of the state-subject fiduciary relation itself. Perhaps the most basic of
these principles is the idea that persons must be regarded as moral equals
77. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS
OF POLICY 242–246 (2002); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Represen-
tation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010). We recognize that public deliberation
and justification regarding human rights may be constrained to some extent by limited public
resources and that national security and other compelling interests may necessitate a measure
of governmental secrecy. To the extent that states rely on such constraints as a basis for limiting
public deliberation and justification, the fiduciary principle dictates that they must justify the
limits of public deliberation and justification on the basis of reasonable, public-regarding fac-
tors, thereby ensuring that citizens and noncitizens are not subject to domination. See Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic
Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 104 (2007) (“Unreasoned coercion denies our moral
agency and our political standing as citizens entitled to respect as ends in ourselves, not as
mere means in the effectuation of state purposes.”).
78. Buchanan, supra note 13, at 62.
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and thus are entitled to institutions supportive of their secure and equal
freedom. Other, more specific principles include those we canvass above:
integrity, formal moral equality, solicitude, and equal security under the
rule of law. Each of these principles should inform both the substantive
content and deliberative process of human rights development, helping to
traverse the normative terrain that lies between dignity and specific human
rights, a terrain these principles share with the ideal of independence.79
V. THE QUESTIONS REVISITED
Above we list several questions that any credible theory of human rights must
be able to address in a principled way. While in some cases the argument
can be just sketched or put by way of illustration, the fiduciary theory yields
principled guidance to all of them.
In what sense are human rights rights?
The fiduciary theory views human rights as the consequence of persons’
moral capacity as self-determining agents to place public institutions un-
der legal obligations. Human rights protect individual dignity against state
domination and instrumentalization by entitling all persons to be treated
in certain ways by public institutions as a matter of right.
Do human rights constitute legal rights, as distinguished from
moral or political rights?
Human rights are legal rights because they are constitutive of the state’s
legal authority to provide security and legal order as a fiduciary of the
people subject to its power. They are legal rights correlative to the state’s
fiduciary (and therefore legal) duty to establish legal order on behalf of
those people. A state that fails to respect human rights transgresses the
fiduciary authorization of state sovereignty, an authorization that flows from
the fiduciary principle, which is itself a principle of legality.
What is the relationship between human rights and state
lawmaking authority?
Because human rights constrain and constitute state legal authority, states
must comply with human rights norms whether they consent to these norms
79. The fiduciary theory thus arguably supports efforts to synthesize substantive principles
and deliberative procedure in democratic theory. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 95–124 (2004) (reviewing and challenging arguments for separating
deliberative procedures from substantive principles).
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or not. A state may not wantonly disregard human rights through the ex-
ercise of its own lawmaking authority, because to do so would violate its
fiduciary obligation to treat subjects as equal cobeneficiaries under the rule
of law. One important implication of the fiduciary constitution of human
rights is that the state must comply with jus cogens norms. State lawmaking
authority is also constrained by derogable human rights, where applicable.
Do human rights generate duties for both state and nonstate
actors?
Under the fiduciary theory, any entity that exercises powers of public ad-
ministration assumes a fiduciary obligation to respect human rights. States
have special obligations to respect human rights because international law
confers upon them the primary legal authority to establish security and legal
order. But sovereign states are not the only entities that may exercise public
administrative powers. In many areas of the world, nonstate actors exercise
administrative powers comparable to those of conventional sovereign states.
The fiduciary principle dictates that any entity exercising unilateral admin-
istrative powers over individuals—whether it be an international body such
as the U.N. Interim Administration for East Timor, a subnational govern-
ment such as the State of New York, or a political/paramilitary group such
as Hezbollah—bears a fiduciary obligation to honor human rights.
How does the fiduciary theory provide guidance for identifying
human rights and clarifying the scope of those rights?
The fiduciary theory aids in identifying human rights by prescribing sub-
stantive principles for distinguishing genuine human rights from counter-
feits. According to the fiduciary theory, all human rights serve a common
purpose: to protect persons subject to state power from domination and
instrumentalization. Norms qualify as human rights if they further these
objectives and satisfy the fiduciary theory’s substantive criteria of integrity,
formal moral equality, and solicitude. For human rights norms to qualify
further as nonderogable jus cogens, their violation must never be consistent
with a state’s fiduciary duty to secure legal order, including the guarantee
of individuals’ fundamental equal security under the rule of law.
These substantive criteria offer a practical, principled framework for clar-
ifying human rights’ content and legal force. As shown above, norms such
as freedom of expression and the right to work satisfy the basic criteria for
human rights because they are designed to further the good of the state’s
subjects and do not offend the principles of integrity, formal moral equal-
ity, and solicitude.80 Other human rights, such as the prohibitions against
80. The ICCPR and ICESCR provide that freedom of expression, the right to work, and
various other human rights are subject to state derogation under certain circumstances. See
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genocide and slavery, likewise satisfy these three substantive criteria but
also qualify as peremptory norms, because their violation could never be
consistent with the state’s fiduciary obligation to safeguard individuals’ fun-
damental equal security under the rule of law.81 As these examples attest,
the fiduciary theory bolsters the determinacy of international human rights
law and enables states to specify genuine human rights and distinguish
peremptory norms from ordinary, derogable human rights.
The fiduciary theory also elucidates the scope of particular human rights.
Consider once again the much-debated prohibition against torture. In the
leading judicial decision on the torture prohibition, Ireland v. United King-
dom,82 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) asserted that torture
can be distinguished from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CID)
and other abusive acts based on the relative “intensity of the suffering in-
flicted.”83 According to the ECHR, the prohibition against torture captures
only the most heinous acts of “cruelty”—those which impose mental or
physical suffering of “particular intensity.”84 This vision of torture and CID
as distinct zones of wrongfulness along an ascending scale of pain and suf-
fering has dominated human rights discourse since the 1970s.85 But states
have found the ECHR’s ascending-scale test to be extraordinarily difficult
to apply in practice. There is little agreement among courts and publicists
about how states should measure the pain or suffering caused by a partic-
ular practice, let alone where they should draw the lines between torture,
CID, and other types of mistreatment.86 As a consequence, human rights
advocates have struggled to explain why the pain and suffering imposed
by waterboarding, hanging by the wrists, sleep deprivation, and other en-
hanced interrogation practices should be considered sufficiently “severe”
to trigger the prohibition against torture.
ICCPR, supra note 8, arts. 4 & 19(2)–(3); ICESCR, supra note 9, arts. 4 & 7. While consideration
of the circumstances supporting state derogation from these nonabsolute human rights lies
beyond the scope of this article, we note that the fiduciary theory supports a requirement
of state deliberation and justification guided by the substantive principles of integrity, formal
moral equality, solicitude, and equal security as well as the procedural demands of the rule of
law.
81. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 40, at 3.
82. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66 (1978).
83. Id., para. 167.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99–36-T, Judgment (Sept. 1, 2004), para.
483 (ICTY) (“The seriousness of the pain or suffering sets torture apart from other forms of
mistreatment.”).
86. See id., para. 484 (considering objective factors such as the “nature, purpose, and
consistency of the acts committed,” and subjective factors such as “the physical or mental
condition of the victim, the effect of the treatment,” and “the victim’s age, sex, state of health,
and position of inferiority”); Z and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29392/95, 34 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 97, 121 (2002) (considering subjective factors such as “the physical and mental
effects on the person experiencing the harm, the duration of the act, and the age, sex, and
culture of the person experiencing the harm”); GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 2, 8 (2005)
(observing that there are “a staggering number of legal definitions” and that it is “virtually
impossible to quantify ‘severe pain and suffering’ or to define it in absolute terms”).
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The fiduciary theory draws the prohibitions against torture and CID into
sharper relief. According to the fiduciary theory’s principle of noninstru-
mentalization, any use of physical or mental violence that denies an indi-
vidual’s dignity by treating her as a mere means to the state’s ends qualifies
as CID. Thus enhanced interrogation techniques such as waterboarding,
hanging by the wrists, and prolonged sleep deprivation all qualify as CID
under the fiduciary theory.
Before we may label such practices “torture,” however, we must consider
an additional inquiry. Whereas the CID prohibition addresses the principle
of noninstrumentalization generally, the torture prohibition targets a criti-
cal subset of CID in which the state deliberately inflicts mental or physical
suffering for the purpose of breaking a subject’s will in order to conscript
the subject as a means to accomplish an end the subject does not share
with the state. For example, public officials engage in torture when they
use violence to extract intelligence or coerce confessions from detainees.87
The torture prohibition is also triggered when public officials intentionally
inflict pain and suffering to compel subjects to renounce human rights such
as their freedoms of expression, association, or religion.88
Whatever the state’s purpose may be, the fiduciary theory suggests that
torture is distinguishable from CID based on the state’s means to achieve
its purpose—the conscription of a subject against her will through the il-
licit use of violence—rather than the relative “severity” or “intensity” of the
subject’s pain and suffering.89 One important consequence of this defini-
tion is that public officials who deliberately inflict pain or suffering in any
degree for the purpose of extracting information from unwilling subjects
(whether through waterboarding, prolonged sleep deprivation, or any other
enhanced interrogation technique) violate the prohibition against torture.
Viewed in this light, the fiduciary theory confirms and clarifies much
of the CAT’s definition of torture but disputes one element. Under the
fiduciary theory, the intentional infliction of “pain and suffering, whether
mental or physical,” constitutes torture if it is intentionally inflicted “by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official”
for the purpose of breaking a subject’s will in order to conscript the subject
as a means to the state’s ends.90 Consistent with the CAT, torture may involve
physical or mental harm and it must have a nexus to “the instigation of or
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.”91 As the ECHR observes in Ireland, however, the CAT
stipulates that an act constitutes torture only if it results in “severe pain and
87. CAT, supra note 10, art. 1(1).
88. Id.; see also David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 425,
433–436 (2005) (discussing these and other purposes).
89. This principle is reflected obliquely in CAT art. 1(1), which provides that torture “does
not include pain or suffering”—however intense—that is not purposeful but merely “incidental
to lawful sanctions.” CAT, supra note 10, art. 1(1).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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suffering.”92 On the fiduciary theory, acts of torture are not to be defined
by the degree of pain or suffering inflicted—whether measured objectively
or subjectively—but instead by the torturer’s illicit purpose for inflicting pain
and suffering: the conscription of a victim’s will. The fiduciary theory thus
offers a principled framework for clarifying and critiquing the scope and
content of the international prohibition against torture.
The fiduciary theory also affirms that states cannot justify acts of torture
by invoking state necessity or citing their failure to ratify human rights
treaties. States are never authorized to torture their subjects—not even
when other lives may hang in the balance—because the fiduciary principle
entitles all subjects to be treated as equal beneficiaries under the rule of
law. To permit a state to instrumentalize any subject through violence for
the benefit of others would eviscerate the fiduciary authorization of state
legal authority. For this reason, the fiduciary theory dictates that torture can
never be justified under the rule of law, irrespective of whether perceived
state necessity or national lawmakers would dictate otherwise.
Do human rights generate positive duties, such as a duty to
provide education, in addition to negative duties of
noninterference?
The controversy in moral and political philosophy over positive duties
roughly tracks disputes in human rights law over economic, social, and
cultural rights (“economic rights”).93 Positive duties are duties that typically
require positive action and impose costs or burdens on the duty-bearer.
In moral and political philosophy, libertarians hold that individuals have
rights to bodily integrity and property, but these are said to give rise to only
negative duties of noninterference that impose no cost on their bearers. For
Robert Nozick and others, contract is the only legitimate source of positive
duties.94 The imposition of noncontractual positive obligations is alleged
to violate the liberty or property rights of the duty-bearer, while negative
duties are consistent with those rights because they require only that the
duty-bearer refrain from interfering with others.
In human rights law, libertarians support civil and political rights be-
cause these rights protect bodily integrity, liberty, and property. Libertarians
claim that the state can respect these rights through self-restraint alone and
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Economic rights are also frequently challenged on the grounds that the judiciary
would have to enforce them and that judges lack institutional competence and democratic
authorization to assess economic and social policy. For discussion and replies to this argument,
see, e.g., NICKEL, supra note 19, at 142–144; PATRICK MACKLEM, INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (2001).
94. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); LOREN LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS AND
THE MORAL COMMUNITY (1987).
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without imposing redistributive costs on others.95 Economic rights, on the
other hand, are seen as suspect because they require positive state action
and do imply redistributive costs. Defenders of economic rights counter
that civil and political rights, such as the right to due process, also require
positive state action and may be just as expensive to secure as economic
rights.96 Yet libertarians insist that positive state action to guarantee civil
and political rights is distinguishable from measures that effectively require
wealth transfers from the well-off to the disadvantaged; the well-off benefit
directly from the presence of universal civil and political rights, whereas in
the case of wealth transfers, they receive no direct benefit. It is not the cost
per se that bothers the libertarian, but that the cost of economic rights is
paid by one party in favor of another who is alleged to have no claim to the
transferred resources.
The fiduciary theory offers a fresh, if surprising, rejoinder to the liber-
tarian’s concern. The rejoinder may be surprising, because the fiduciary
view relies on Kant’s theory of right, which is coldly indifferent to needs
and interests. Within Kant’s theory there is no duty of easy rescue, because
the imposition of such as duty would let the need (even the urgent need)
of the rescuee unilaterally set the terms of interaction with the rescuer. In
the absence of a legal relationship capable of sustaining positive duties, the
only duties that exist under Kant’s theory are the negative duties of non-
interference cherished by libertarians. These are the only general duties
that can be owed equally by all so as to respect the bodily integrity and
property of others; they are the only kinds of general duties that can let
everyone enjoy an equal freedom in which no party can impose terms uni-
laterally on another. Libertarians happily concede that the state is entitled
to enforce these duties as well as positive obligations arising from contract;
both kinds of duties are necessary to respect the rights and equal freedom
of separate persons. What libertarians overlook is that fiduciary relations,
like contractual relations, give rise to positive duties, as demonstrated by
the parent-child case. Although Kant’s theory does not impose a duty of
easy rescue on strangers, it does impose this obligation on parents, and it
imposes on other fiduciaries positive duties of a similar nature.
As a fiduciary, the state is under an obligation to secure its subjects’ in-
dependence. To the extent that the economic rights set out in the ICESCR
are necessary to protect agents from instrumentalization and domination,
the state is under an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill them. To see
how such duties may arise under the fiduciary theory, consider the right to
95. See, e.g., CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?, supra note 54.
96. See, e.g., NICKEL, supra note 19, at 148–149; DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 34, at 30–32. Proponents of economic rights also claim that these rights, like civil and
political rights, have a negative dimension, though it is the redistributive effect of the positive
side of economic rights that makes them so controversial. See, e.g., DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 30.
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education.97 Article 13 of the ICESCR provides for a universal right to ed-
ucation that includes compulsory and publicly funded primary education.
Secondary and higher education is to be made available to all and accessible
by the progressive introduction of free education. Within a modern state
with complex rules of private law and public law, an individual lacking in
literacy and civic education would depend on the grace of others to know
her legal rights. Although those educated others, like the beneficent slave
master, might never abuse their power, they would necessarily dominate
anyone forced to depend on them for want of education. Furthermore, the
illiterate would be unable to access public offices, participate in public de-
bates, or otherwise engage in democratic processes that presuppose literacy
and civic education.
Because the fiduciary conception of the state views its subjects as agents of
coequal status, it must provide the resources necessary for them to be able
to know their rights and participate in political life on an equal footing. A
necessary feature of this capability is education, and so the fiduciary state is
under an obligation to provide it.98 The libertarian citizen can be asked to
contribute a fair share because the state on which she relies for liberty and
property can retain its legitimacy only by complying with its fiduciary duty
to provide education.
To put the point within the human rights vocabulary of “respect, protect,
and fulfill,” it is not enough for states to respect the right to education by
refusing to interfere with private education schemes. Nor is it enough for
states to protect the right if this means only that states will prosecute third
parties that interfere with others’ enjoyment of the right to education. States
must actually fulfill the right so as to provide subjects with coequal legal and
political status and secure them against dependence on others. States must
do this because all state action must be authorized by the fiduciary principle
on behalf of everyone subject to the state’s power, and the fiduciary principle
cannot authorize states to create a kind of order in which some are entirely
dependent on the choices of others.
The fiduciary theory’s injunction against dependence or domination has
implications that extend beyond the right to education. The theory sup-
ports a right to minimal resources broadly consistent with the right to “an
adequate standard of living” enshrined in Article 11 of the ICESCR. The
state’s fulfillment of this right is necessary to ensure that the propertyless
97. Our discussion is indebted to Arthur Ripstein’s careful analysis of how a right to publicly
funded education and poverty relief flows from Kant’s legal and political theory. See RIPSTEIN,
FORCE, supra note 68, ch. 9.
98. While we do not explore the link here, the fiduciary theory is congenial to the “ca-
pabilities” approach to freedom defended by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, one that
stresses the importance of persons’ capabilities to “lead the kind of lives they value—and have
reason to value.” AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18 (1999); see also Martha Nussbaum,
Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution, in OXFORD STUDIES IN ANCIENT
PHILOSOPHY (1988). The relevant capabilities under the fiduciary theory are those necessary to
lead lives free of domination and instrumentalization.
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are not left to depend for their survival on the charity of others. The same
rationale applies to the right to public health care (ICESCR art. 12): fidu-
ciary states must fulfill this right because a failure to do so would place the
disadvantaged ill at the mercy of others.
A skeptic might think that the fiduciary theory is too demanding. James
Nickel, for example, affirms that economic rights are human rights but
suggests that their scope should “aim at preventing the terrible rather than
achieving the best.”99 One might think that the idea of progressive realiza-
tion set out under Article 2.1 of the ICESCR goes too far by requiring states
to “take steps . . . to the maximum of available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.”100 The fiduciary theory, however, supplies a principled
benchmark against which to assess whether economic rights have attained
“full realization”: such rights are fully realized if their enjoyment permits
agents to lead lives marked by independence rather than domination. In the
case of education in developed countries, this would mean, at a minimum,
equal access to free primary and secondary education.
The implication of this right is that the state is entitled to assess and collect
taxes to pay for public education. But students might properly be expected
to contribute to professional postsecondary education provided that such
education remains accessible to all, through loans if necessary. Presumably
an individual need not become a professional to enjoy independence. The
fiduciary theory is thus consistent with the prevailing view that human rights
establish a minimal threshold rather than a complete theory of distributive
justice, though the threshold is set comparatively high.
If human rights derive from the inherent human dignity of the
individual, as is often supposed, can they apply to certain classes
of individuals (such as children) and to collectivities or groups
(such as indigenous peoples)?
Human rights under the fiduciary model can apply to particular classes
of individuals, such as children, women, migrants, prisoners, the elderly,
and so on, because these individuals possess certain attributes or live un-
der certain conditions that render them vulnerable to instrumentalization
and domination. Children, for example, are vulnerable to their parents’
discretionary power as well as to the state’s analogous power when it acts in
its parens patriae role. The Convention on the Rights of the Child empha-
sizes throughout that the state must act with due regard for the child’s best
interests, securing the child against abuse and domination.101
99. NICKEL, supra note 19, at 36, 140.
100. ICESCR, supra note 9, art. 2.1.
101. CRC, supra note 57, arts. 3, 9, 18, 20, 21, 37 & 40. For thoughtful discussion of the
amenability of universal human rights norms to discrete classes of individuals, see NICKEL, supra
note 19, at 162–163.
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The idea that collective or group rights are in some sense human rights
is more problematic, since the putative right-holder in this case is not an
individual but a group. In the case of indigenous peoples, for instance, the
right-holder is an indigenous people (or nation) rather than an indigenous
individual. But in what sense does a people have dignity analogous to the
dignity of the individual? Peoples may be thought to have dignity analogous
to individuals because both are persons. For Kant, a person is simply “a subject
whose actions can be imputed to him.”102 If peoples, like states, may have the
actions of their institutions and representatives imputed to them, then they,
too, may be viewed as artificial persons that require agents to act for them.
Peoples, in other words, are persons in the relevant, Kantian sense. From
this perspective, the primary difference when compared to individuals is
that someone must act on a people’s behalf. But as long as those actions can
be attributed to a people as such, a given people is a person and therefore
worthy of respect in its own right. Whereas for liberalism the basic unit
of moral value is the natural person or individual, in Kant’s theory of the
right, the basic unit of value is the person, including artificial persons such
as states and peoples.
Peoples are vulnerable to “alien control” or domination as typified by
colonialism.103 Alien control renders a people vulnerable to the will of
another state or agency and undermines the ability of the dominated peo-
ple’s institutions to govern and represent their members. Viewed from the
bottom up, alien control subverts the ability of individuals to act collec-
tively, since by hypothesis, their institutions are under alien control rather
than their own domestic control. Ultimately, alien control of a nation
dominates the nation’s members as well as the nation’s collective legal
personality.
The value of a people’s institutional capacity to represent its members
is acknowledged by Article 1 of the ICCPR, which affirms, inter alia, that
“[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination.”104 The placement of
self-determination at the very outset of the ICCPR hints that its drafters
viewed self-determination as a precondition to the enjoyment of individual
human rights. The fiduciary model, through its accommodation of group
rights as human rights, vindicates the priority that self-determination enjoys
in international human rights law. Self-determination is necessarily a group
right in international law because to grant an individual a unilateral right
to secede or assert political autonomy is antithetical to law. Practical con-
siderations aside, the individual-as-political-sovereign would be in a state of
nature vis-a`-vis all others and would stand as judge and party of her own
causes. The right of self-determination therefore must be a group right
rather than an individual right, and this right is a human right because
102. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 2 at 50.
103. For discussion of domination as alien control in international affairs, see Pettit, Repub-
lican Law, supra note 71.
104. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 1; see also Indigenous Peoples Declaration, supra note 57, arts.
3 & 4.
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its realization is necessary for human beings to live under conditions of
nondomination.105
Are human rights culturally relative or universal?
On the fiduciary theory, the human rights norms of international law are
provisional legal norms of universal application within and across insti-
tutionalized societies. These norms are of “universal” application in that
some of them, such as the torture prohibition, apply to every human
being, while others apply to everyone falling within the stipulated class
of right-holder, such as women and children. Yet others attach univer-
sally to certain kinds of groups, such as the right of all peoples to self-
determination. Human rights norms are provisional because they are sub-
ject to ongoing amendment and refinement pursuant to democratic delib-
eration, a deliberative process both structured and guided by the ideal of
independence.
Several features of this conception of human rights mitigate concerns
about Western parochialism. First, the conception is limited to addressing
threats of instrumentalization and domination, with a special emphasis on
those posed by the salient and ubiquitous institutions found in every state
today. It does not impose its more institutional norms on traditional so-
cieties that lack the relevant threat-posing institutions. For example, the
fiduciary conception does not require traditional aboriginal societies that
rely on restorative justice mechanisms to provide a public defender for
what might be a criminal trial in a formal Western legal system. General
fiduciary obligations can be institutionalized in very different ways in differ-
ent contexts. The fiduciary theory universalizes agents’ independence but it
is democratic and sensitive to local conditions at the point of interpretation
and application.
The deliberative, democratic aspect of the fiduciary theory, as indicated
above, also mitigates the threat of Western bias by inviting representatives
of traditional or non-Western societies to participate in the development
of human rights law. Relying on democratic deliberation necessarily raises
the difficult issue of who is to decide controversial disputes. Still, there is
no obvious reason to think that this issue would prove any more intractable
in international relations than in the democratic politics of multinational
105. An objection to this analysis is that business corporations are legal persons but are
not usually thought to have human rights. One reply is that recognition of “peoples” is nec-
essary to the purposive self-determination of their constituents in a way that recognition of
corporations is not and that the Kantian concern for personhood is really a concern for pur-
posive self-determination. Admittedly, this reply makes the justification of the group right of
self-determination depend on a concern for the group’s members. Yet the right is still a group
right because peoples are separate legal persons who represent the group’s members, and these
members individually cannot claim the right. This conception of purposive self-determination
offers a plausible basis for distinguishing peoples from corporations.
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states; in both cases, minorities exist and are entitled to a fair opportunity
to participate, one that includes protection from majoritarian domination.
And in both, the participation of minorities lends (or would lend) legitimacy
to the process and its outcomes.
Finally, the fiduciary concept resonates with analogous legal concepts
found in non-Western societies. Legal scholars trace the fiduciary concept
as far back as the Code of Hammurabi in Ancient Mesopotamia (present-
day Iraq) and show that the idea of fiduciary obligation informed Islamic
law and the Jewish law of agency.106 The modern Anglo-American law of
trust owes a considerable debt to the waqf from Islamic law—a donor-
created endowment under the administration of a trustee for use by des-
ignated beneficiaries. Franciscan friars returning from the Crusades in the
thirteenth century introduced the waqf to England.107 Moreover, schol-
ars in non-Western societies that traditionally emphasize collective identi-
ties (e.g., family, clan, nation, religion) over individual freedom and dig-
nity likewise observe that implied fiduciary obligations structure public
and private legal institutions.108 For example, one contemporary Chinese
philosopher describes “the ideal Confucian society as a ‘fiduciary com-
munity’ in which the corporate effort of the entire membership turned
the group into ‘a society of mutual trust instead of a mere aggregate of
individuals.”’109
Thus, while the debate over cultural relativism in international human
rights discourse cannot be addressed fully in this article, the fiduciary the-
ory’s sensitivity to local conditions, its democratic aspect, and its resonance
in non-Western societies all suggest that it is less vulnerable to complaints
of Western bias than are other theories.110
106. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 7–14 (2007); Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Mod-
ern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1139 (1996); Robert G. Natelson, The Govern-
ment as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 191
(2001).
107. Avini, supra note 106, at 1140–143.
108. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1607–1608 (2000); see also SEN,
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 98, at 240 (“The valuing of freedom is not confined to one culture
only, and the Western traditions are not the only ones that prepare us for a freedom-based
approach to social understanding.”).
109. Ruskola, supra note 108, at 1627 (quoting TU WEI-MING, CENTRALITY AND COMMONALITY:
AN ESSAY ON CHUNG-YUNG 67, 81 (1976)).
110. Naturally, we recognize that certain aspects of the fiduciary model may challenge tra-
ditional norms and practices in some societies. For example, some public officials may persist
in viewing citizens or noncitizens as resources of the state (or its ruling class) rather than as
ends in themselves. Others may pursue policies emphasizing collective security and collective
prosperity in ways that transgress the fiduciary principles of nondomination and noninstrumen-
talization. We take comfort, however, in the fact that few states persist in defending practices
of exploitation and arbitrary discrimination under the banner of cultural relativism. And in
any event, the fiduciary theory is primarily a normative theory, so it is no failing that some state
practices flagrantly violate its requirements.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Debates over human rights have been waged largely between foundation-
alist theorists, who appeal to natural rights, and proponents of practical
theories, who insist that international human rights law must be under-
stood on its own terms. The fiduciary theory offers an attractive way forward
by taking seriously, on the one hand, the foundational idea that agents must
be regarded as possessing equal dignity, and on the other, the practical idea
that human rights law is the international community’s best provisional es-
timate of the rights that states must honor. The linchpin to the fiduciary
theory is the idea that human rights cannot be understood or specified in
the abstract; they arise only from a legal relationship in which public insti-
tutions hold administrative powers over vulnerable agents who, as private
parties, are not entitled to exercise those powers.
This relational aspect of the fiduciary theory is especially potent because
it permits the theory to relativize particular human rights to the institutional
circumstances of their application, but in a way that remains true to the spirit
of the human rights agenda through a commitment to noninstrumental-
ization and nondomination. This same commitment calls for democratic
deliberation, a requirement that reveals the fiduciary theory’s allegiance
to popular sovereignty, as well as independent agency. Taken together, the
various implications of the fiduciary principle comprise a unified theory
capable of justifying the legal status and enduring appeal of human rights.
